National Interests- " End of Cold War"

Such a judgment would always see the CIS as a group of lesser states dependent on Russian substitute and subject to Russian interference whenever it was deemed necessary.

As Fukuyama points out, the notion of a core of changeless study interests has changed over time. Geopolitical factors that were believed to determine much(prenominal) a set of interests for nations still remain important to some degree. As Fukuyama notes, for example, geography has considerable jolt on defining field of study interest when a nation, such as Poland, is situated surrounded by two aggressive large powers. The imperatives of power nonplus an impact on every nation, since depicted object gage is a changeless national interest. Each sovereign country must have a means of ensuring its security--whether this consists of an army of its own or a system of tout ensembleiances with stronger nations (Fukuyama 12-13). But these interests are, in today's world, far less fundamental than in the past. In many cases, Fukuyama argues, it is ideological or cultural goals that are meant when the national interest is discussed (13).

Technological advances, changing definitions of legitimacy, and the maturation in the nature of economic production, have all unite to undermine the predominance of what were formerly seen as stable, and unavoidable, national interests. As these changes take place, the national interests of previous decades no longer apply. A good example is Fukuyama's instance of the new undesirability of try

As Fukuyama points out, much of the identification of national interests be done by Russia's leaders is merely a counter to the outstanding power mode of the nineteenth century. Ideologies of various kinds support the notion that Russia must dominate the entire CIS region, but all these claims are based on the expressed desire to hit economic growth among all CIS members. The foreign policy implications of such renewed domination are clear. This is probably why Stankevich feels called upon to cast so much ingenuity and energy in list that this Russian national identity is nothing like those national identities that totally dominated Central Asia and Eastern Europe in the past.

It is a mistake Fukuyama argues, for Russians to believe that, since the decline of the nation's superpower office in a bipolar international system, they need to strain to shore up the country's position as a neat power in the balance-of-power mode that prevailed in previous centuries. But, as arguments by Stankevich and Nikolai Travkin, founder of the Democratic Party of Russia, show, this need for great power status is behind varying conceptions of Russian national interests.

ing to retain control over territory inhabited by other ethnic groups. Where nations once derived considerable benefits from such arrangements, colonies, or subsidized satellite states, are now primarily a drain on a nation's resources, and, in view of the invite for ethnic self-determination, such states constitute political and military threats as well. Today, it is economic growth--in productivity and income levels--that is the principal national interest in most nations (Fukuyama 17). Though security remains a lucid national interest for every nation, the terms on which security is sought have changed considerably. As Fukuyama notes, nations that attempt, in today's world, to make the maximisation of power a primary goal, are actually probably to impede their progress toward economic gro
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